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ABSTRACT 
The main function of IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is to protect the system, analyze and predict the 
behaviors of users. Then these behaviors will be considered an attack or a normal behavior. Though IDS 
has been developed for many years, the large number of return alert messages makes managers maintain 
system inefficiently. In this paper, we use RST (Rough Set Theory) and SVM (Support Vector Machine) to 
detect intrusions. First, RST is used to preprocess the data and reduce the dimensions. Next, the features 
were selected by RST will be sent to SVM model to learn and test respectively. The method is effective to 
decrease the space density of data. The experiments will compare the results with different methods and 
show RST and SVM schema could improve the false positive rate and accuracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The intrusion behaviours cause the great damage of systems. So enterprises search for intrusion 
detection systems to protect their systems. The traditional technology such as firewall is used to 
defense attacks. Thus, the IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is usually used to enhance the 
network security of enterprises. 
The major difference between firewall and IDS system is that firewall is a manual passive 
defense system. Comparatively, IDS could collect packets online from the network. After 
collecting them, IDS will monitor and analyze these packets. So, IDS system acts as the “second 
line of defense”. Finally, it will provide the detecting results for managers. The detecting results 
could be either attack or normal behaviour. An ideal IDS system has a 100% attack detection 
rate along with a 0% false positive rate, but it is hard to achieve. Detecting illegal behaviours of 
the host or network is the major object of IDS. The IDS is actually such a system to detect some 
illegal behaviour. One of the ability of IDS is it could monitor various activities on the network. 
IDS will send a warning message to the managers if it detects an attack. Briefly, the aim of 
intrusion detection is to identify malicious attacks. There are two main methods of IDS: misuse 
and anomaly [11]. The idea of misuse detection is to establish a pattern or a signature form so 
that the same attack can be detected. We will describe it in next section. The other idea here is 
to establish a normal activity profile for system. Anomaly detection utilizes soft computing 
methods to detect attacks, for instance, Neural network [10], Static analysis, Data mining [8] 
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etc. Anomaly detection can detect new attacks, but it has a higher false positive rate. Large 
number of transmission packages will lead to computation overloading and worse performance. 
In this paper, we will purpose an intrusion detection method to reduce the features of 
transferring packages using the method of Rough Set Theory.  If the number of the key features 
is decreased correctly, the noise of data to affect the systems analysis performance will be 
lower. Primary experiment results prove our research can improve the attack detection rate. 
The remainders of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature of 
intrusion detection systems. Section 3 introduces our methodology. Section 4 shows the 
experiments results and Section 5 is conclusions and future works. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
2.1. The type intrusion methods 
The IDS improves the attack detection rate (ADR) and decrease the false alarm rate (FAR) 
[7][8][14]. The Denial-of service (DOS) attacks also called the Distribution Denial-of Service 
(DDOS) attack is shown in Figure 1. The attacker uses large numbers of computers to login 
system in a short period of time or to transfer mass numbers of packages. These actions will 
lead to overloading of the host. The network services of host will stop. Large resource of the 
host such as the utilization of CPU and memory and the networks bandwidth are consumed by 
the attack. SYN-flood, Smurf, Teardrop and Ping of Death are belonging to the DoS attack. 
 
Figure 1 The schema of DDoS/DoS. 
The intruders find the user’s account or the system setting out of gear. The R2L attack tries to 
intrusion the system. SQL Injection is one kind of the R2L attacks. U2R attack uses the 
unauthorized account to control system. The methods of U2R use the virus, worm, to overload 
buffer of memory to exceeding the limitation of memory access. For instance, the several of 
Buffer, Overflow Attacks are typical traditional U2R attack. Hackers scan the protocol of the 
computer before they launch attacks by port Scan action. The hackers find the weak spots and 
software design weakness to intrude a system. Port Scanning and the Ping-Sweep are typical 
traditional port scan attack. 
 
2.2. Intrusion detection system 
Intrusion Detection System has misuse detection and anomaly detection(Figure 2). The known 
attack behaviours are constructed from misuse detection attribute database in the development 
stage. Misuse detection system compares user behaviours with attribute database to find 
intrusions. Anomaly detection system defines system exactly normal behaviours in rule 
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database. The contrast between collects system parameter and defines behaviours can find the 
misbehaviours in system.  
 
Figure 2 The Flow Chart of Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detection Application Flow Chart  
 
A. Misuse Detection 
Misuse detection sets up the attack behaviours based on known attack behaviours during the 
development stage. The misuse detection is similar to antivirus software. The antivirus software 
compares the scanned data with known virus code. If system finds un-normal attributes, the 
virus is existence and removes it. Hence, misuse detection collects the known attack behaviours 
from attribute database. If the attack behaviour is similar to the one in database, the misuse 
detection can defend it before the intruder destroys our system. 
 
B. Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection is different from misuse detection. The system constructs user model 
based on normal users have behaviours. When user has misbehaviours, the system 
notifies users that has an intruder. The main drawback of anomaly detection is that the 
detection is depended on the latest attack models, so it can’t indentify new attack 
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behaviours. The intruder attack methods will be changed, so anomaly detection system 
collects normal behaviours and detects intruding using normal behaviours. The anomaly 
detection system has a party with clearly defined correct user behaviours. The problem 
is intruder uses normal behaviours to attack the system. 
IDS system monitors the packages transmissions on the network. While malice behaviours have 
happen, IDS will send an alert to the network manager or use a related method to defense the 
attacks. Most intrusion detection systems are classified as either a NIDS (Network Based 
Intrusion Detection System) or a HIDS (Host Based Intrusion Detection System) [6][13]. In 
general, NIDS is located between host and firewall. HIDS was usually installed on a server or 
main computer as shown in Figure 3. NIDS collects and analyzes the information at the host. 
NIDS could monitor the data real time on the network. If NIDS finds illegal behaviours, it will 
send messages to the managers. Comparatively, HIDS monitors the activities of the host. So it 
can determine whether an attack or not. The data of HIDS is caught by the host, so it is not easy 
to be influenced by some methods, just like encryption. Entropy has been used in intrusion 
detection for a long time. B. Balajinath et al. used entropy in learning behaviour model of 
intrusion detection in 2001[2]. TF-IDF is often applied to IDS, too. Such as Wun-Hwa Chen et 
al. compared SVM to ANN for intrusion detection, their methods are based on TF-IDF. The 
Unauthorized Access from a Remote Machine (R2L), and The Unauthorized Access to Local 
Super-user Privileges (U2R) both are intrusion behaviours which will be detected by HIDS. 
 
Figure 3 The hybrid system of IDS. 
 
3. THE METHODOLOGY 
The flowchart is our intrusion detection method shown as Figure 4 which comprises three 
steps. First, data pre-processing and data discretion are utilized to do data arrangement. Next, 
the RST is used to find useful features. Finally, the system uses the SVM to classify the data 
[2][12], which will be described as follows.  
 
Figure 4 The workflow of the system in training phase. 
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3.1 Pre-processing 
In this section, we will introduce the KDD cup’99 and use the database to test the system 
performance. The KDD Cup 1999 Data is original from 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation [9]. A process can be composed of many system calls. A system call is a text record. 
In this phase, some useless data will be filtered and modified. For example, some text items 
need to be converted into numbers. Every process in the database has 41 attributes shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 KDD cup’99 features 
No. Features No. Features 
1 duration 22 is_guest_login 
2 protocol_type 23 count 
3 service 24 srv_count 
4 flag 25 serror_rate 
5 src_bytes 26 srv_serror_rate 
6 dst_bytes 27 rerror_rate 
7 land 28 srv_rerror_rate 
8 wrong_fragment 29 same_srv_rate 
9 urgent 30 diff_srv_rate 
10 hot 31 srv_diff_host_rate 
11 num_failed_logins 32 dst_host_count 
12 logged_in 33 dst_host_srv_count 
13 num_compromised 34 dst_host_same_srv_rate 
14 root_shell 35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
15 su_attempted 36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 
16 num_root 37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
17 num_file_creations 38 dst_host_serror_rate 
18 num_shells 39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 
19 num_access_files 40 dst_host_rerror_rate 
20 num_outbound_cmds 41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 
21 is_host_login   
 
This dataset has been used for the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
Tools Competition. The task of this competition was to build a network detector to find “bad” 
connections and “good” connections. For “bad” connections, the attack has categories, shown in 
Table 2. An example of KDD cup’99 [9] is shown in Figure 5. There are several text words in 
the dataset. The system will transform text into numeric values in advance. For example, the 
service type of “tcp” is mapping to 3 and the system will follow Table 3 to transform it into the 
numeric form, as described in Figure 6. 
0,tcp,http,SF,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0
.00,9,9,1.00,0.00,0.11,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal. 
0,tcp,http,SF,239,486,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.
00,19,19,1.00,0.00,0.05,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal. 
0,tcp,http,SF,235,1337,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0
.00,29,29,1.00,0.00,0.03,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal. 
Figure 5 The original data of KDD cup’99 
 
0,3,19,10,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,9,9,1,0,0.11,0,0,0,0,0 
0,3,19,10,239,486,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,19,19,1,0,0.05,0,0,0,0,
0 
0,3,19,10,235,1337,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,29,29,1,0,0.03,0,0,0,
0,0 
Figure 6 After transform from original data 
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Table 2 Data types and attacks classification 
Attack types class Attack types class 
Normal Normal guess_passwd 
apacha2 Imap 
back multihop 
land named 
mailbomb phf 
netune sendmail 
pod snmpgetattack 
processtable snmpguess 
smurf spy 
teardrop warezclient 
udpstorm 
DoS 
warezmaster 
buffer_overflow worm 
httprunnel xlock 
loadmodule xsnoop 
R2L 
perl Ipsweep 
ps mscan 
rootkit nmap 
sqlattack portsweep 
xterm 
U2R 
saint 
ftp_write R2L satan 
Probe 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Transformation table 
Types Class No. 
Protocol_type TCP 3 
Protocol_type UDP 7 
Protocol_type ICMP 9 
Flag OTH 1 
Flag REJ 2 
Flag RSTO 3 
Flag RSTOS0 4 
Flag RSTR 5 
Flag S0 6 
Flag S1 7 
Flag S2 8 
Flag S3 9 
Flag SF 10 
Flag SH 11 
Attack or Normal Attack 1 
Attack or Normal Normal 0 
 
3.2 Feature selection by rough set 
Using the RST reduces the attributes for SVM operation. Rough Set Theory [3][5][14][15] is 
one of data-mining methods which reduces the features from large numbers of data. Using RST 
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needs to build the decision table or the information table. The decision table describes the 
features of processes. Formally, an information system IS (or an approximation space) can be 
shown as follows. 
IS = (U, A) (1) 
Where U is the Universe (a dataset of process, U={x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,…,xm}) and A presents the 
attributes of a process, for instances, (A={a1,a2,a3,a4,a5}). The definition of an information 
function is fa: U→ Va, Va is the set of values of the attributes. For example, the values of U and 
A are listed as follows and they are mapping to Vi. 
U= {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, …, xm} 
A= {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} 
V1= {1, 2, 3, 4} 
V2= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
V3= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
V4= {1, 2, 3} 
For every set of attributes B⊆A, if b (xi) = b (xj)( every b⊆B), there is an indiscernible relation 
Ind(B). Continuous, to define the basic concepts, namely the Upper approximations and Lower 
approximations of a set let X represents the elements of subset of the universe U (X⊆U). The 
lower approximations of X in B (B⊆A) represents as BX such as follows.  
}][|{ )( XXUXBX Bindii ⊂∈=  (2) 
 
The lower approximations of set X of process xi, which contained X of elementary set in the 
space B. The upper approximation of set X is BX. BX represents the union of the elementary 
which is a non-empty intersection with X. 
BX= { 0][| )( ≠∩∈ XXUX Bindii } (3) 
For any object xi of lower approximation of X (xi BX∈ ), it is certainly belongs to X. For object 
of xi of upper approximations of X (xi BX∈ ), it is called a boundary of X in U. The difference of 
upper and lower approximations is: 
BNP = BX - BX  (4) 
If the upper and lower approximations are identical (BX = BX ), the set X is definable; 
otherwise, set X is indefinable in U. There are four types of the set of indefinable in U. Ø 
represents an empty set. 
If BX ≠  Ø and BX≠ U, the set of X represents roughly definable in U; 
If BX ≠  Ø and BX=U, the set of X represents externally indefinable in U; 
If BX = Ø and BX≠ U, the set of X represents internally indefinable in U; 
If BX = Ø and BX≠ U, the set of X represents totally indefinable in U. 
 
Using all attributes to do intrusion detection is ineffective. In this paper, RST is used to combine 
the similar attributes and to reduce the number of attributes. So it can enhance the processing 
speed and to promote the detection rate for intrusion detection. An example of RST is shown in 
Figure 7. 
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O:1,0,3,19,10,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,9,9,1,0,0.11,0,0,
0,0,0 
O:2,0,3,19,10,239,486,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,19,19,1,0,0.05,0,0
,0,0,0 
O:3,0,3,19,10,235,1337,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,29,29,1,0,0.03,0,
0,0,0,0 
Figure 7 The Rough set input data form  
 
3.3 Intrusion estimation 
In this paper, we construct an SVM [7] model for classification. While intrusion behaviors 
happens. SVM will detect the intrusion. SVM uses a high dimension space to find a hyper-plane 
to perform binary classification, where the error rate is minimal. The SVM can handle the 
problem of linear inseparability. The SVM uses a portion of the data to train the system, finding 
several support vectors that represent the training data. These support vectors will be formed a 
model by the SVM, representing a category. According to this model, the SVM will classify a 
given unknown document. A basic input data format and output data domains are listed as 
follows. 
( ii yx , ),…, ( nn yx , ),x
mR∈ ,y∈{+1,-1}  (5) 
Where ( ii yx , ),…, ( nn yx , )are a train data, n is the numbers of samples, m is the inputs vector, 
and y belongs to category of +1 or -1 respectively. On the problem of linear, a hyper plan can 
divided into the two categories as shown in Figure 8. The hyper plan formula is: 
(w．x) + b =0 (6) 
The category formula is: 
 
(w．x) + b  if yi = +1 (7) 
(w．x) + b  if yi = -1 (8) 
 
Figure 8 The hyper-plane of SVM. 
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However, for many problems they are not easy to find hyper planes to classify the data. The 
SVM has several kernel functions that users can apply to solving different problems. Selecting 
the appropriate kernel function can solve the problem of linear inseparability. Another important 
capability of the SVM is that it can deal with linear inseparable problems. Internal product 
operations affect the classification function. A suitable inner product function K (Xi．Xj) can 
solve certain linear inseparable problems without increasing the complexity of the calculation. 
4. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The experiment used a AMD Athlon™ 64 X2 Dual Core Processor 5000+ 2.59G MHz 
computer with 512MB RAM, and implemented on a Windows XP Professional operating 
system. The data was collected from the MIT Lincoln Lab, 1998 DARPA intrusion detection 
evaluation program. The data set offers seven weeks of training data and two weeks of testing 
data. We randomly selected some of the data for training data and testing data. The DARPA 
data is labeled with a session number, each session including several processes, which in turn 
consist of system calls. A total of 24,701 processes were used as training data, while 15,551 
processes were used as testing data that are shown in Table 4. We have 41 features initially, 
which are presented and calculated their frequency in this database. LibSVM was used as our 
classification tool [3]. 
The total of 41 features, entropy and 29 RST feature values are used to train the three SVM 
models. After the pre-processing process, data are formatted for RST. Then, the data of 
discretion is imported the RST by analysis tool. RST upper and lower approximation is utilized 
to seek the relation and un-relation of feature attributes. The features were selected by RST 
which are shown in Table 5. 
Table 4. The training data and test data 
 Train Ratio Test Ratio 
Normal 4863 19.69% 3029 19.48% 
Probe 205 0.83% 208 1.34% 
DoS 19572 79.24% 11492 73.90% 
U2R 2 0.01% 11 0.07% 
R2L 56 0.23% 809 5.20% 
Total 24701 100.00% 15551 100.00% 
Protocol type, Services, and Flag are transformed into numerical values. The LIBSVM data 
format is: 
LIBSVM format: [Label] 1: f1 f2 f3 f4…fn. (9) 
 
Before using SVM classification [16], we need to do “scaling”. This action is to 
increase the accuracy, decrease the overlap, and reduce complexity [7]. Our system uses 
the kernel of RBF K(x , y)=
2yx−−γλ . 
In the SVM classify, we will take the tool to do classification the attributes of features 
before the pre-processing step. We use the SVM to train and to test processes. Base on 
the estimation enhance operate in the intrusion detections, the estimation formula is 
listed as follows. The output of SVM is 1 or -1. If the output is 1, it is an intrusion 
behaviour on the model. If the output is -1, it is normal. Using LibSVM tool [7] to 
classification estimate intrusion or not. 
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Table 5. The features after RST operation 
No. Features No. Features 
1 Duration 16 rerror_rate 
2 protocol_type 17 same_srv_rate 
3 src_bytes 18 diff_srv_rate 
4 dst_bytes 19 srv_diff_host_rate 
5 wrong_fragment 20 dst_host_count 
6 num_failed_logins 21 dst_host_srv_count 
7 logged_in 22 dst_host_same_srv_rate 
8 num_compromised 23 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
9 root_shell 24 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 
10 num_root 25 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
11 num_file_creations 26 dst_host_serror_rate 
12 num_shells 27 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 
13 num_access_files 28 dst_host_rerror_rate 
14 Count 29 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 
15 serror_rate   
 
4.1 The Estimation Method of Wired Networks IDS 
In wired environment, the resource and the energy of a computer is infinite. The intruder 
intrudes operation system by virus or worms, such as Trojan horse. Hence, the IDS trains 
intruder behaviors model by an artificial intelligence (AI) method. The system trains old data 
for new attack behaviors. The main estimating methods are precision and recall. The wired 
network IDS estimates parameters shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 The Wired Network IDS Estimation 
Parameter Definition 
True Positive Rate (TP) Attack occur and alarm raised 
False Positive Rate (FP) No attack but alarm raised 
True Negative Rate (TN) No attack and no alarm 
False Negative Rate (FN) Attack occur but no alarm 
 
Helmer et al (2002) [4] shows the precision formula in (10). Precision stands for that the attack 
has been occurred and the IDS detects correctly. This formula use TP to divide TP adds FP to 
find precision rate. 
Precision = 
TP
TP FP+  (10) 
Recall stands for an attack is happened and IDS detects attacks from really attacks. This formula 
use TP divide TP adds FN to find recall value shown in formula (11) 
Recall = 
TP
TP FN+  (11) 
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Agarwal et al (2002) [1] observes that overall formula. When the attack has been occurred, IDS 
detects attacks correctly. This formula use TP adds TN to divide TP adds FP adds FN adds TN 
to estimate overall accuracy which is shown in formula (12). 
Overall = 
TP TN
TP FP FN TN
+
+ + +  (12) 
The false alarm is defined as an intrusion has been occurred but IDS can not detect correctly or 
intrusion happens. The formula uses FP adds FN to divide TP adds FP adds FN adds TN to 
calculate false alarm rate which is shown in formula (13). 
False Alarm = 
FP FN
TP FP FN TN
+
+ + +  (13) 
Those formulas mainly use to estimate the effects of wired network IDS.  
 
The research object is to increase the accuracy of SVM. We use the RST to reduce features. 
SVM use to archive the supervisor learning and find a suitable kernel of SVM classification. 
Using the test data evaluates system performance. The data distribution of training data and 
testing data are shown in Table 6. User can use this model to evaluate the IDS. We use (1) all 41 
features, (2) entropy features and 29 RST features values to train three SVM models 
respectively, and to compare the accuracy of the three models. To estimate the performance of 
the system, three important formulas are used to evaluate system accuracy [12]; attack detection 
rate (ADR), false positive rate (FPR) and system accuracy (SA). 
Attack Detection Rate= attacksectedofnumberTotal
attacksofnumberTotal
　　　　　 det ×100%  (14) 
False Positive Rate = processesnormalofnumberTotal
processesiedmisclassifofnumberTotal
　　　　　　
　　　　　　 ×100% (15) 
Accuracy Rate= processesofnumberTotal
processesclassifiedcorrectofnumberTotal
　　　　
　　　　　　　　 ×100% (16) 
The experiments tested attack detection rate, false positive rate and accuracy among 41 features 
input SVM, Entropy inputs SVM, and after Rough Set reduces feature input SVM. Accuracy of 
41 features input to SVM is 86.79% but the ADR is only 70.03%. The result of this study is not 
well because the feature is not reduction of attributes and the loading is too heavy for the 
system. The Entropy features input SVM has using reduction of feature and the ADR reaches 
92.44% but the accuracy is only 73.83%. The accuracy of our proposed method is the best but 
its false position rate and attack detection rate are worse than Entropy to SVM. Table 6 shows 
the results. 
 
Table 6. Comparison of three methods using SVM 
 Attack Detection Rate False Positive Rate Accuracy 
41 features to  SVM 70.03% 29.97% 86.79% 
Entropy to SVM 92.44% 7.56% 73.83% 
Rough Set of SVM 86.72% 13.27% 89.13% 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we have proposed an intrusion detection method using an SVM based system on a 
RST to reduce the number of features from 41 to 29. We also compared the performance of the 
SVM with that of a full features and Entropy. Our framework RST-SVM method result has a 
higher accuracy as compared to either full feature or entropy. The experiment demonstrates that 
RST-SVM yields a better accuracy. 
In the future, we will increase number of testing data for our system and to find vary of 
accuracy. We also hope to combine RST method and genetic algorithm to improve the accuracy 
of IDS. 
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